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Abstract
This bachelor thesis investigates the field of hostile takeovers predominantly
from the perspective of the management of the target company. Partic-
ular emphasis is placed on review of the defense strategies against hostile
takeovers and ways in which they might be abused by the management. This
thesis attempts to formulate a game-theoretic model describing the process
of a hostile takeover as an extensive-form game with perfect information.
Payoff functions for the game further in the thesis computed as Nash equi-
libria of bargaining problem with the current state of the game as a base for
the utility gains. We then briefly discuss the implied relationship among the
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Abstrakt
Tato bakalářská práce se zabývá oblastí nepřátelského převzetí společnosti
převážne z pohledu managementu společnosti, která vystupuje jako kořist.
Zvláštní důraz je kladen na sumarizaci obranných strategií proti nepřátel-
skému převzetí společnosti a na způsoby, kterými může management tyto
strategie zneužívat. Tato práce se pokoůsí o formulaci teorie-herního modelu
popisujícího proces neprřátelského převzetí společnosti v rozvinuté podobě
a s úplnými informacemi. Výplatní funkce pro tuto hru jsou v této práci
počítány jako Nashova ekvilibria vyjednávacího problému s aktuálním stavem
hry jako výchozí pozicí pro nárůsty užitků. Poté tato práce stručně disku-
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Preliminary scope of work
Hostile takeovers play an important role in the stock market as every pub-
licly traded company is potentially vulnerable to them. The vast literature
spans numerous attempts to create (hopefully successful) defensive strategies
to prevent hostile takeover. We shall make an effort to utilize game theory
to provide answers to the following research question: "What is the most
efficient defensive strategy when facing a tender offer and how does this
strategy affect the shareholders?" Our model shall be based on the recent
results of Loyola and Portilla (2016). In the process of answering this ques-
tion we shall focus on subsequent goals. In particular, we shall investigate
an effective algorithm to defend against a hostile takeover in an optimal
way. Further, we shall inspect whether the optimal defense strategy leads to
a loss for the shareholders, whether there exists a defensive strategy which
will not leave the company much weaker than it was before the raid, and
last but not least, whether the equilibrium in a Hostile Takeover game is in
favor of the raider. In this thesis we shall also include some case studies to
illuminate the effects of the described theory.
In the light of the research hypotheses specified above, the results of this
thesis might be useful in practical situations for a decision making process
of putting hostile takeover defenses in place.
Outline
Introduction
Literature review and basic strategies on hostile takeovers
Games in extensive form
Game-theoretic model of hostile takeover
Case studies, results and discussion
Conclusion
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1 Introduction
Hostile takeovers are a crucial composite of the corporate world as every pub-
licly traded company is potentially vulnerable to them. McKinsey&Company
(2007) outlined that only in the year 2006 over 100 hostile transactions took
place, being cumulatively valued at over 520 billion USD. Even though the
motivation of the target in such a hostile takeover to attempt to defend it-
self might not be obvious, as the shareholders of the target company tend to
experience high positive abnormal returns during the takeover (Jensen and
Ruback, 1983), the management of the target company seldom embraces the
takeover which would likely lead to inevitable redundancy of their positions
(Harris, 1990; Jarrell 1985).
Throughout the history numerous defense strategies have been developed
to assist the board of the target company to either improve their negoti-
ation position, or directly neutralize the raider’s ability to continue with the
takeover attempt. A broad span of academic literature examined and evalu-
ated these strategies separately, however a paucity of practical implications
has been expressed. In addition, the available research has shown significant
controversy is present in utilization of the strategies.
Consequently, the lack of conclusive designation of effectivity and suit-
ability of defense strategies to specific scenarios led to scarcity of literature
illuminating the grand scheme of managerial options of defense, thus virtual
absence of a recommendation which could be made on behalf of defending
the company against hostile takeovers is present. This thesis shall attempt
to utilize game theory to provide further insight on optimal behavior of the
management regarding their utility maximization, thus treating the impact
on shareholder wealth as means and not objective.
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The topic of hostile takeovers and defensive measures against them calls
for various approaches. This thesis shall not argue with distinguished au-
thors who undertook this topic from different angles (e.g. regulatory, share-
holder wealth maximization) as it shall delimit itself to addressing hostile
takeovers from the perspective of the management and subsequently evaluate
the impact on shareholders.
Examples of previous research regarding systematic evaluation of defense
strategies against hostile takeovers shall be found in section 2 of this thesis
as well as brief introduction to hostile takeovers. Review of relevant liter-
ature regarding game theory along with a general introduction into games
in extensive form shall be found in section 3 and section 4 shall make an




This section of this thesis shall provide a brief summary on hostile takeovers,
address the reasoning of the parties playing a role in this process, and finally
review some of the most important defense strategies we are going to utilize
in the model.
Hostile takeovers are generally considered to be any attempts to usurp
corporate control on the takeover market (“a market in which alternative
managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources”,
Jensen and Ruback, 1983) which is performed against the will of the man-
agement of the target company. On the contrary, Schwert (2000) inclines
to not interpreting the hostility in hostile takeovers as entrenchment, but
rather as bargaining strategy. They might take the form of mergers, tender
offers or a proxy fight (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
Proxy fight (more precisely “proxy contest”) is described as a scenario in
which an insurgent group attempts to occupy controlling portion of seats on
the board of directors (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Tender offer is a broadly
used term describing an offer for purchase of shares which is made directly
to the shareholders who decide on whether to accept it or not under their
own discretion. Also referred to as a “hostile bid”.
Rationale behind the raider’s attack
First and foremost, we shall discuss the reasoning behind the raider ini-
tiating a takeover attempt. Even though the only reasonable explanation
of a hostile bid is the perceived financial gain by the attacker, the means
may vary. Schleifer and Vishny (2003), while not denying other findings,
identify a connection between mispricing of a company by the market and
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the probability of it being taken over.
Abreast with this phenomenon, other variables may be of key importance
regarding the incentive for the takeover attempt. Holmstorm and Kaplan
(2001) argue that the takeover activity also brings potential improvement of
the effectivity of certain companies if operated as a single entity. By exten-
sion we can conclude that other than mispricing-related factors affecting the
rationale behind a hostile takeover might be at play as for instance ensuring
access to the target’s distribution channels, customer base or goodwill of the
brand.
Harford (2005) provides evidence on economic, technological and reg-
ulatory shocks, in case of sufficient available outstanding liquidity, being
responsible for merger waves. In accordance with the preceding, Martynova
and Renneboog (2008) also conclude that specific shocks have causal rela-
tionship with merger waves. In addition, they even suggest that after the
optimal stopping point of a merger wave is passed, there is still suboptimal
merger activity which might be caused by “limited information processing,
hubris or managerial self-interest”. This supports the theory that factors
different from mispricing of companies also account for takeover activity.
It is also notable, that rationality of these attacks has been has been
examined from multiple perspectives. According to Schwert (2000) in case
of the bidder the assumption of rationality correlates with reality, although
it has been shown that this might not be the case in every scenario (e.g.
Millstone & Subramanian, 2007).
Rationale behind the management’s defense
Jensen and Ruback (1983) define corporate control as “the rights to determ-
ine the management of corporate resources”. As hostile takeovers are means
through which corporate control is established, it seems evident that in the
aftermath of a successful hostile takeover the raider is likely to either replace
the current management as he would consider it to control the company in a
sub-optimal manner or let the management of the acquiring company to take
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control, thus rendering the current managerial positions redundant. This by
itself provides a strong incentive for the management to attempt to prevent
the takeover from taking place.
The board of directors of a company is typically composed of either man-
agers who are under strong influence of major shareholders, or in some cases
shareholders themselves. Thus, from this point onward this thesis shall refer
to the board, controlling shareholder or a group of controlling shareholders
and the management interchangeably. As a result, numerous subsequent
factors of the management’s decision to defend the company from a hostile
bid arise. The board of directors is likely to manage the target company
in a manner consonantly with their stances, values and presumably social
responsibility, which may all be violated in case a corporate raider would
acquire the company and retain only a fraction of his interest, reselling the
remainder for parts.
Complementary to this, Ruback (1987) argues that the solemn fact of a
hostile bid might be recognized as a sign of incompetence of the management
to operate the company effectively, as it indicates unfulfilled potential. Thus,
the board of the target company may perceive such offer to be a sign of
weakness and be inclined to defend its position.
Position of the shareholder
There is a broad agreement among academic literature on the positive effect
of hostile takeovers on target shareholder welfare which corresponds with
the intuition of higher premia being offered during hostile takeovers, thus
the target shareholders receiving abnormally high payments in comparison
with the market value.
Many argue that the natural unwillingness of the management of the tar-
get to accept the takeover and thus grant their shareholders the benefit of
thriving from the premia is undesirable. Jarrell (1985) deliberates the pos-
sibility of takeover defenses such as golden parachutes to be the solution to
this problem as they provide an incentive for the management to negotiate
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on behalf of the shareholders with their best interests in mind. In addition,
Berkovitch and Naveen (1990) provide examples on how can “value redu-
cing defense strategies” increase the benefit for shareholders of the target
company.
2.1 Defense strategies
The following part of this thesis shall attempt to summarize the most import-
ant strategies used as defense against hostile takeovers. Furthermore, this
part shall discuss the effects and consequences of the respective strategies
in terms of market value of the company, effectivity and alternation of the
negotiation power of the management. These defenses may be partially di-
vided into preemptive and reactive takeover defenses. Preemptive defenses,
such as poison pills or staggered boards, are those which may be already
in place before the takeover attempt has started, while reactive defenses,
such as targeted repurchase or litigation, refer to those which are executed
succeeding the time of the initial bid.
Examining the defense strategies essential to formulation of a descriptive
game theoretic model further in the thesis, as there is no standardized way
to thoroughly describe the effects of the defense strategies on the takeover
process and bargaining. The list of the strategies is not exhaustive, as some
of the strategies were left out due to either limitations of the model, or
insufficient available rigorous information on them (e.g. white knight de-
fense strategy is not included, although this thesis was inspired by the work




It is self-explanatory that many shareholders prefer not to sell their shares
at the first instance a tender offer is made and utilize the time pressure
forced on the raider to leverage a more favorable price negotiation posi-
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tion (Comment and Jarrell, 1987). As a reaction to this phenomenon, the
acquirer often creates an incentivized environment for the shareholders to
forego their shares by utilizing so called front end loaded takeover. In such
a case, the tender offer in the first stage includes provisions guaranteeing a
second stage price for the final merger. The first-tier price is substantially
higher than the second one, thus it increases the pressure on the sharehold-
ers to accept the original terms (Ruback, 1987) and refrain from free-riding
into the second stage, as the expected value of it is below the original one
(Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987)
Martin Lipton, a corporate lawyer, comments on the issue of tender offers
followingly: “First, the special dynamics of a tender offer are such that the
decision of shareholders is almost always a foregone conclusion - they will
tender; therefore, it is misleading to speak of a free shareholder choice at
all. The existence of an offer to acquire a controlling interest in a company
makes it almost impossible for a shareholder in the target to prudently retain
his shares ...”. This is often the case if the company is not protected by fair
price amendments, as such approach is favorable for the raider.
Fair price amendments prevent such behaviour, unless it is negotiated
with the management or the offer gets accepted by the supermajority of
the shareholders and increasingly more companies tend to include some pro-
visions in the spirit of fair price amendments into their charters. (Jarrell
and Poulsen, 1987), and force the bidder to offer a blended price to all the
shareholders (Ruback, 1987). This strategy does not impose any extension
of costs on the raider, it does however force a different form of the offer,
which removes the increased incentive for the shareholders to accept the
offer as soon as possible. Although Comment and Jarrel (1987) provide
empirical evidence about the fair price amendments having no measurable
impact on the final premium at which the merger is performed, Ruback
(1987) classifies it as mild, but at least somewhat effective strategy. The
main point of implementation is not complete prevention of the takeover, as
it rather aims at improving the negotiation baseline for the management of
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the target company in case of a tender offer. The estimated average effect
on stock prices caused by this preventive measure is -0.65 percent (Jarrell
and Poulsen, 1987).
In the model, we are going to work with the premise, that such an anti-
takeover measure is in some form indeed implemented, as this strategy is to
some extent often also represented in the legal code and is heavily used in
the cases of a purchase of the whole company.
Golden parachutes
Golden parachutes are a very common measure not only protecting man-
agers from hostile takeovers, but also stabilizing their position inside of the
company. These provisions usually grant the management certain benefits
in case of termination of their employment, thus making it very costly to
remove them from the position.
It is quite intuitive that the general public views these provisions as neg-
ative, and Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2014) report that the implementation
of these contributes a decrease in stock value at the level of about 5 per-
cent. What is more, they report the shareholder wealth to be also negatively
affected by these measures, suggesting that “could be due to golden para-
chutes increasing managerial slack and/or to golden parachutes providing
executives with incentives to go along with some acquisitions that do not
serve shareholder interest”.
Staggered Board
The definition of the term Staggered board slightly varies among available
literature (c.f. Ruback (1987), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)), however the core
remains unchanged. This strategy prevents complete instant replacement of
the management by shifting the election periods for parts of the board of
directors in such a way, that a majority can be obtained after a minimum of
two non-simultaneous elections. The typical setting of such a provision is a
division of the directorial positions into three classes and holding an annual
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election, at which only one of the classes of directors is voted into position
(Koppes et al, 1999).
Implementation of such election mechanism results in a long transitional
interim during which the original management would still have control over
the company, even after the takeover. The defenders of this provision argue,
that it not only to some extent protects the company from potential hostile
takeovers, but also grants substantial stability to the company (Koppes et
al, 1999), as in case of turbulent environment among the shareholders the
impact on the management of the company is reduced and the company
itself is thus protected from the threat of fundamentally changing its long-
term plans and strategies frequently. In the period between the years 1995
and 2002 around 60 percent of the companies in IRRC database did use
some variation of staggered board. We might thus conclude this strategy to
be a common phenomenon.
There are two ways in which this rule can be implemented into the com-
pany: As an amendment to the charter, or as an amendment to the bylaws.
This distinction is very important mainly for the purpose of observation of
the effects a staggered board has on value of a company. Even though Jarrell
and Poulsen (1987) conclude that the effect is, although negative, statistic-
ally insignificant, in a more recent study, Bebchuck and Cohen (2005) show
statistically significant lower market value of companies which did implement
staggered board mechanism through the company’s charter. On the other
hand, they also provided empirical evidence that bylaw-based staggered
boards exhibit only very mild and marginally statistically significant neg-
ative effects on company value.
As for the effectiveness of this strategy, due to the generally lower level
of rigidity among bylaws, bylaws-based staggered boards do not show vast
potential to prevent a hostile bid. On the other hand, Ruback (1987) charac-




Poison pill is one of the strategies which aim to deflect the potential raider
even before the takeover attempt has begun. Their implementation is pub-
lic and they are not primarily meant to be executed, rather to deter the
potential acquirer by their implied activation after such an offer would be
made. According to Bruner (1991) who has thoroughly described different
variations of the poison pill in effect at the time, the core principle of this
defense strategy is to provide an option to dramatically increase the present
value of the current shares exercisable after a trigger event (which is usually
either a new shareholder, or one of the current ones, obtaining more than a
predetermined portion of the shares).
The two main variants of the poison pill are so called flip over and flip
out poison pills (Ruback, 1987). In the flip in form, the shareholders may,
after the trigger event, purchase common stock worth a multiple of the
current price for a discount price, which is considered to be an exercise
price, rather than the price of the stock. The raider is explicitly excluded
from this right, thus as a natural consequence, the portion of shares the
raider possesses dramatically decreases, the price of the remainder of the
shares raider would want purchase dramatically increases and lastly there is
created a large economic dilution of the raider (Bruner, 1991). The flip out
form, on the other hand, endangers the raider directly: “This provision would
have the effect of exhausting the target’s assets and making the takeover less
attractive. If the shareholder declined to convert into target shares or to put
the preferred stock back to the target, this preferred stock automatically
carried the same conversion rights into the stock of the bidder ...” (Bruner,
1991).
Poison pill became popular after a confirmation of the legality of such
amendments by Delaware Chancery Court ruling in 1985 (Ruback, 1987).
Although Comment and Schwert (1995) state the following: “Our new evid-
ence on how stock prices change with poison pill adoptions does not sug-
gest an economically meaningful degree of deterrence.”, they still provide
10
implicative proof of either presence of deterrence, or negative information
about ongoing negotiations. Moreover, they provide that the net effect of
these amendments in combination with business laws. Their conclusion,
“From this perspective, the evidence we provide about the actual takeover
rate and premiums paid as a function of antitakeover devices outweighs the
event study evidence in judging deterrence.” does suggest effectivity of this
strategy. In addition, they state that development and implementation of
these provisions made “complete deterrence feasible”. Bruner (1991) goes as
far as concluding, that “From the standpoint of deterrence, the poison pill
is virtually a sure thing.”
There is also no conclusive evidence pointing at a negative impact of such
defensive method on stock prices, as the studies are usually inconclusive in
the scale and significance of the effect (c.f. Comment and Schwert (1995),
Ryngaert (1988)), however they agree on a decline in stock prices in case
these provisions are activated.
2.1.2 Reactive
Crown jewel defense
Crown jewel defense is a popular designation of a specific variation of as-
set restructuring. This strategy is based on selling the most valuable assets
of the company and thus appearing less attractive to the raider. As such,
this strategy is very controversial and many consider it to be automatically
harmful for the shareholders, although there seems to be no empirical evid-
ence which would prove this theory conclusively. Due to being a special case
of asset restructuring, the effect on the company value of this strategy is also
very complicated to observe and separate from other noise, however has been
shown, that utilization of such strategy often results in either disciplinary
action, or general loss of confidence on the part of shareholders (Franks and
Mayer, 1996).
Controversy of this strategy may be well represented by the approach
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of the courts, as before the Revlon rule triggers1, the managers may use
this strategy to some extent, however after the trigger, their options are
drastically restricted (Kurp, 1994).
Dual class recapitalization
Dual class recapitalization is a general corporate governance strategy which
is based on issuance of stock with superior voting rights. Such a stock is then
distributed among the shareholders, which are given the option to exchange
this stock for the ordinary, common stock. Shareholders are incentivized to
utilize this option, as the stock with superior voting rights does usually suffer
from lower dividend returns and/or lower marketability (Ruback, 1987).
Another variation of this approach is issuance of preferred shares, which
provide higher dividend returns in exchange for limited to no voting rights,
which are issued as new stock and thus the capital investment can be in-
creased without endangerment of the voting position of the current dominant
shareholders.
Naturally, such a plan provides the managers with a disproportionate
dominant voting rights and the general belief is that it creates environment
for the managers to commit entrenchment (Dmitrov and Jain, 2006). As our
model shows later in this thesis, without commenting on potential of the dir-
ect entrenchment during the time the management retains their managerial
positions, it is a very dangerous strategy for the shareholders mainly in the
case the management achieved deflection of one hostile takeover through
this strategy and then faces another one, as it provides the management
with very powerful tool to skew a substantial proportion of the premium by
utilizing the bargaining power gained from utilization of this strategy.
Dmitrov and Jain (2006) conclude, that the dual class recapitalization
strategy does not pose as an unreasonable risk of entrenchment of the man-
agers and that it does not have any negative impact on the stock prices in in
the following years. It is, however, important to note that their research is
based on U.S. companies’ data, thus the rest of the world is not accounted
1See section Litigation of this thesis
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for in this conclusion. In addition, they specifically state that the returns
diminish aggregately with non-native U.S. companies entering the market.
This strategy might be a very effective defense against hostile takeovers
while it also might have little to none negative impact on the stock prices,
as even in case of a successful bid for the shares with lower voting rights,
the raider would not have the possibility to take control over the company
(Ruback, 1987). While the potential of this strategy is large, it is very
dependent on the case-by-case usage and can result in the opposite - being
a great burden for the company, while providing very little security.
Litigation
This strategy is crucial for creating a proper model, as it limits the possible
steps the managers may undertake to ensure keeping their positions and
forces them to refrain from denying the shareholders an offered premium in
case the offer has already been made.
As litigation is common phenomenon in the corporate world, it is also
a common defense against hostile bids (Ruback, 1987). This becomes self-
explanatory when the strict regulatory environment and rigid form of the
guidelines for mergers and acquisitions are accounted for (Kurp, 1994). Win-
ning the case, even though it is an obvious success in terms of deflection of
a hostile takeover, may not be among the top relevant goals of litigation, as
it might be used merely as a pure defense strategy and not as a winnable
case.
The main objective of such scenario is typically to delay the negotiations,
as the initial offer, or even rumors about the offer, attract other potential
bidders to raise the offer, resulting in a bidding war which provides superior
standpoint for the shareholders in the negotiations (Gilson and Kraakman,
1990). It is important to note that stalling is very effective after the initial
offer has been made, for as aforementioned, it drains the raiders resources
heavily. Another important potential positive outcome of litigation for the
target company is the possibility of the raider himself raising the offer to
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avoid this prolonged process and legal fees (Gilson and Kraakman, 1990).
As for a third effect litigation may have on an ongoing hostile bid, it typically
forces the raider to provide a broader disclosure accessible to the sharehold-
ers, thus often discredit the bidder in the eyes of the shareholders (Kurp,
1994).
Obviously, fully justified suits also play an important role in the world of
M&A, however we can hardly speak of them as of defense strategies, as they
constitute rather legal mechanisms separate from the takeover power play. It
is notable that litigation in the other direction is also very common, as the
raider is usually accusing the target company’s management of breaching
their fiduciary duties. This resulted in the conception of so called Revlon
rule, originating in the U.S. case law, which became a generally accepted
legal guideline. Gilson and Kraakman (1990) characterize the rule as follows:
“The short answer can only be: As long as shareholders remain free to choose
between alternatives, the board actually facilitates an auction - and hence
discharges its duty under Revlon - by offering shareholders an attractive
alternative to an existing bid. The critical distinction is between the board’s
freedom to offer shareholders an alternative and the board’s freedom to
impose that alternative on shareholders. Any recapitalization transaction
can be cast either in a form that may be implemented on management’s
authority alone, as in Black & Decker and Bass Group, or in a form that
requires shareholder approval, whether by tender or vote.” It is of high
importance to note that the Revlon rule only applies to post-offer defenses
and thus does not limit the preemptive measures management might be
implementing. Kurp (1994) states that upon the trigger of the Revlon rule,
target boards are no longer allowed to employ takeover defenses, unless they
are made with the intent to improve the target shareholders value.
Targeted repurchase and standstill agreement
Targeted repurchase represents a post-offer anti-takeover measure consisting
of buying the shares the bidder currently possesses back and not extending
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this offer to the remaining shareholders (Ruback, 1987). It might be very
tempting for the raider to exploit this option, as shall he accept, the profit
would be completely risk free as opposed to continuation with the hostile
takeover, which always involves certain degree of uncertainty.
Chang and Hertzel (2004) argue that a targeted repurchase from entities
in their sample, which either are “known takeover specialists” or purchased
the stock within a year before the repurchase, is significantly higher than
otherwise. This confirms the intuition that substantially higher premium is
required by the raider, when the targeted repurchase is used as a takeover
defense, specifically 9.1 percent and 1.3 percent respectively. Ruback (1987)
argues that the negative impact on company value is at the level of 3 percent,
however is more than covered by the initial increase of the stock value which
occurs after the initial takeover offer is made. In accordance with this Klein
and Rosenfeld (1988) provide evidence on the overall effect being a 6.45
percent increase (excluding the interim period cumulative abnormal return),
while the two-day repurchase abnormal return being a 3.27 percent decrease.
As for the effectivity of this defensive measure, it is one with vast poten-
tial, however no guarantee (Ruback, 1987). The success is fully dependent
on the willingness of the raider to accept the offer, which by extension means
it is dependent on the observable expected value it provides him.
Standstill agreements are more of a negotiation of an armistice than an
actual defense. This strategy relies on coming to an agreement with the
aggressor and convincing him to enter a contract which ensures preservation
of status quo on his side in exchange for either several seats on the board of
directors or votes of the management on a certain topic (Ruback, 1987).
The shareholder who attempted to initiate the takeover is then potentially
less incentivized to continue with the hostile bid, as he might reach his goals
through this agreement. As aforementioned, ownership of the company is
often not the primary goal of a raider, as these conflicts are led over power
within the company. Thus, this agreement may be perceived as a treaty
rather than a defense. The effects on the stock prices seem to follow the
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same logic as in the case of targeted repurchase (Ruback, 1987), as these
two defenses are trivially very similar - both require cooperation on the side
of the hostile bidder and could be characterized as quid pro quo.
Final note on defense strategies
A variety of unique defense strategies may be utilized by the target company
to avoid the hostile takeover. While some are perceived to be very effective,
such as poison pills, most of these defenses also bring up extremely sensitive
matter of the position of the shareholders and their utilization may, even
though neutralizing the attacker, lead to unavoidable exchange of the man-
agement inside the target company and thus resulting into an overall loss for
the board. It is essential to keep the fact the current shareholders may also
decide on exchanging the management themselves, thus not only regulatory
restrictions apply while utilizing defense strategies against hostile takeovers.
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3 Games in extensive form
3.1 Game theory
Game theory is an aggregate of analytical instruments which help us to un-
derstand the phenomena in the decision-making process during interaction
of separate entities (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). We can find the origins
of game theory as far as in the ancient times when soldiers on battlefields
were facing a decision between fighting and fleeing to maximize their chance
to survive. This situation, while being curious in itself - overlapping philo-
sophy with analytical reasoning, also presents the soldier with the dilemma
that his fellow comrades-in-arms are facing precisely the same decision, thus
forcing the soldier to take their decisions into account alongside with his own
preferences (Ross, 2014).
While following the footsteps of the fathers of game theory, we must not
miss Antoine Augustin Cournot, who in the year 1838 formulated a theory
which allowed for investigation and modelling of oligopolistic competition
among entities. Today, we would call the methodology he utilized to analyze
models rising from the aforementioned theory “Nash Equilibrium” which, to
say the least, is quite surprising as Nash was publishing more than a century
after Cournot. The reason is even though Cournot did use the approach
before Nash, he did not generalize it to the broad solution methodology for
non-cooperative game theory and rather only used a single application of it
(Myerson, 1999).
The next milestone in development of game theory, or rather its prede-
cessors, came with the mathematician Emile Borel who in the year 1921
published a paper in which he for the first time presented the term “method
of game”, which should be viewed as a ruleset that would determine the next
17
step of a person given every possible circumstance. He did so by forming a
matrix of every possible expected values for the players in the given game
(Myerson, 1999).
Although Borel did already provide foundations for theory of games, it
was not until John von Neumann who in 1927, for the first time in history,
formulated a general model of extensive games - such that the players move
in sequence after each other and are provided with imperfect information
about the current state of the game (they do not have comprehensive in-
formation about the other players’ previous moves). The game itself is a
mathematical term describing the totality of the rules which describe it,
while the players (also agents) are the decision makers playing the game
by choosing their actions according to the information they have (von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, 1953). Von Neumann followed Borel and after the
formulation of the model defined a strategy for each player to represent a
set of rules, which at every possible stage in the game when it is the play-
ers turn determines the respective players next move, as a function of his
information at the given stage. An important distinction of his approach in
this paper from later works lies in his restriction towards the players’ ability
to choose a strategy exclusively before the start of the game. Nowadays, we
would denote such a structure as the “normal form”, as von Neumann and
Morgenstern did so for the first time in their work in 1944 (Myerson, 1999).
Von Neumann continued to investigate games, namely zero-sum games
(which are such games that a gain in utility for one player automatically
results in an equivalent loss in utility for another one), and in the year 1928
published the proof for the minmax theorem. As minmax solution to zero-
sum games relies on the principle of one agent maximizing the minimum at
which the game may conclude and the other agent minimizing the maximum
at which the game may conclude, which has proven to be a key principle
in zero-sum games, the proof of this theorem, stating that the minmax
solution in the case of finite two-person zero-sum games exists and is a Nash
equilibrium, showed to be invaluable to the development of game theory.
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The very existence of game theory as a separate mathematical field is
considered to begin with the revolutionary book “Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior” by von Neumann and Morgenstern first published in
1944. It was the first work to summarize the knowledge and research made
on game theory at the time and provided an axiomatic definition of a n-
person game consisting of 21 axioms. Another giant contribution this work
has done is fundamentally new approach to measurement of utility and its
maximization problem, lying mainly in comparability solved by new axio-
matic definition. Von Neumann and Morgenstern also proposed utilization
of backward induction as a solution method, which has later proven to be
invaluable. Last but not least, they have shown strategy to be a linking tool
between games in normal and extensive form (which we shall discuss further
in this thesis). Although this book was indeed a huge step forward, there
was still a crucial shortcoming, as they fully focused on zero-sum games with
transferable utility (Meyerson, 1999).
From this point onward, development of game theory moved at a fast
pace, as John Forbes Nash Jr. published his work on a general solution to a
two-agents bargaining model in 1950 in which he did not assume the property
of transferability of utility. He elegantly utilized the individual’s utility
theory presented by Neumann and Morgenstern and concisely described it
on Mr. Smith’s utility from obtaining a new car. In combination with
Nash (1953) he has proven the equilibrium in two-agent bargaining model
under complete information is such that it maximizes the product gain of
the utilities2 (Harris, 1990). He then continued in his next work to establish
a general definition of equilibria in normal form games, while also proving
the existence of such equilibria for randomized strategies in all finite normal
form games (Meyerson, 1999). Nash (1951) also showed, that cooperative
games may be simply reduced to non-cooperative ones via transferring the
game into the phase of negotiation of the terms of cooperation. This way
2This statement holds if the outcome to the bargain is a division in which both of the agents benefit
from coming to an agreement and does not hold if at least one of the agents would be better off without
the bargain coming to an agreement at all.
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Nash managed to create a general solution concept of games.
Many different types of games were investigated in the field of game the-
ory, as for instance aforementioned cooperative and non-cooperative games,
where in the case of cooperative games the distinction from non-cooperative
ones lies in the ability of agents to form coalitions and play the game “to-
gether”, which is especially useful in political economy, while non-cooperative
games strictly forbid such behavior (used mainly in competitive environ-
ment when cooperation is either impossible, or not allowed, for example in
poker). Another crucial distinction must be made according to the informa-
tion which the agents possess. We know multiple ways of describing inform-
ation (complete vs incomplete, symmetric vs asymmetric, etc.), however
the most important one for this thesis is perfect and imperfect information.
While perfect information assumption requires every agent at any point of
the game to have full information about the current status of the game and
payoff functions of his opponents, games with imperfect information do not
impose this restriction (Rasmusen, 2006).
3.2 Formal definition of games in extensive form
For the purpose of this thesis we shall focus only at a narrow part of game
theory, namely finite non-cooperative perfect information two agent dynamic
games in extensive form with classical rationality assumption and simple bar-
gaining theory. While there are different streams in game theory regarding
approaches to rationality (Binmore, 2015), as the game we shall attempt to
model consists of utility addressable by monetary indices, none of the issues
arising in other cases do not need to concern us.
To continue with this thesis, we shall first properly define a game in
extensive form. We must start by firstly defining a set N = 1, 2, ..., n of
agents. We then define a rooted tree, T , called the game tree. We now must
assign every non-terminal node (also called a leaf) of the rooted tree T to
an agent i ∈ N ∪ {0}, where the agent 0 represents nature (or the game
itself) and is used to probabilistically determine the moves which the other
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agents cannot affect. This way, we distribute the non-terminal nodes of the
rooted tree T into n + 1 subsets P 0 through P n, where the members of P i
are denoted as the nodes of agent i. For each node in P 0 there must be
a probability distribution over its direct successors (which are the closest
nodes in the direction of the game). For the game to fulfill the attribute of
extensive form, it shall also hold that for each i ∈ N a partition of P i into
ki information sets U i1 through U
i
k(i) is such, that for each j = 1, 2, ..., k(i):
1. every node in U ij has the same number of direct successors and the
sets of outgoing branches3 of different nodes in U ij are corresponding
one-to-one;
2. every directed path (meaning a sequence of nodes) in T from the root
to a terminal node may go through U ij at most once.
Every terminal node of the rooted tree is assigned an n-dimensional vector
g(t) consisting of members g1(t) through gn(t), each of which represents a
payoff of the respective agent. The last necessary part of the formal definition
of a game in extensive form is the common knowledge among the players
about this system of the game (thus of the whole definition), which is often
referred to as complete information (Hart, 1992)4.
3.3 Examples
In this section of the thesis we shall present few examples of games to illu-
minate the meaning of the aforementioned. First, we shall briefly look at the
notoriously known example of Prisoners dilemma, which is a great example
of a normal form game. Two prisoners are facing a decision whether to con-
fess, or not. If none of the prisoners confesses, they will both be sentenced
3A branch of node x is a set of all successors to a direct successor of node x, including the direct
successor.
4It is necessary to mention, that not all of the notation used in Hart, 1992 was preserved. For instance,
Hart distinguishes a player from an agent, as agents are in his definition making decisions on behalf of
players, however as in this thesis we are going to operate with “perfect recall” which refers to the player
remembering all of his previous choices made throughout the game, we may treat them as a common
entity, as the nature of the problem to be examined in this thesis does not allow for any other case.
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to one year in prison. On the other hand, if both of them confess, they will
be both sentenced to three years in prison and lastly if only one of them
does confess and the other does not, the one who confessed will be freed
and the other one will receive a sentence in the duration of four years. By
examining this problem in a vacuum and assuming that the utility of the
prisoners originates solemnly in the duration of the sentence, we can easily
argue that each prisoner is incentivized to select the strategy “confess” over
the strategy “not confess”, as it is superior - the prisoner will be better off
regardless of which strategy does the other prisoner choose. Such a phe-
nomenon is in game theory called “strongly dominated strategy”. From this
simple thought, we can easily derive the conclusion, that the Nash equilib-
rium of this game will lie in the point with payoffs (3; 3) and both prisoners
will confess.
To illuminate simple bargaining problem, we may look at the pie division.
Two players are bargaining on how will they split time spent in the bathroom,
while the utility function of one player is u1 = t+
1
4
, where t is the proportion
of the available he is going to receive and second player’s utility function is
u2 = t −
1
8
. The game is played under complete information, thus both
players are aware of the structure of the game and the payoff. If we let ε
be the proportion of the pie which the first player receives, we can calculate





















which is the proportion of the time spent in bathroom attributed to the




is the time attributed to the second player.
To show utilization of the backward induction, we may consider a simple
“game” in the civil meaning in which two players are playing against each
other under the traditional assumption of rationality on a playing field de-




ations incapable of obtaining the solution (although of course game theory
is still utilized in artificial intelligence algorithms combined with machine
learning).
Finally, there are vast applications of different types of game theory across
various fields including biology, economy (Rasmusen, 2006) or computer
science (Roy, 2010).
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4 Game-theoretic model of hostile takeover
Problem Setup
In this part of the thesis we shall address properties of the problem we are
going to analyze, so that we may attempt to formulate a model based on
game theory further in this thesis.
The problem may be perceived as utility maximization problem for the
management at given parameters of the state of the world in the event of
potential hostile attack on the target company under weak corporate gov-
ernance. In the first stage of the problem, management has to decide on
which preemptive defense strategies it wishes to implement and weight their
potential profit out of every possibility available. Afterwards, the raider,
who sees a potential added value from some synergies which would arise in
case the target was overtaken by the raider, engages into evaluating whether
he wishes to attempt a hostile takeover of the target company or to forfeit
the opportunity and refrain from interfering with the target, in which case
the game ends5. In the case he decides to proceed, the raider presents the
shareholders with an tender offer in the amount of O, which leads to trig-
gering the Revlon rule, thus every offer which the management bargains at
the end of the game must provide at least the same benefit to the sharehold-
ers6. Once the raider has decided on his further endeavors, the management
5We shall assume that the synergies are only available in the case of the raider taking over the target
company as a whole and would be completely lost in any other case, including the option of the target
company taking over the company represented by the raider and utilization of the white knight defense
strategy. This assumption may be justified either by inferior sources of financing available to the target,
or by insufficient expertise of the management.
6Although the Revlon rule is related to the monetary amount offered for the shares and not utility, as
we are going to consider the utility of the shareholders to only consist of financial factors, we may treat
them as if they were one.
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has the choice on which reactive strategies are to be put in place and thus
influence the expected future market value of the company, the position of
the management in the target company (in terms of proportional decline of
the added private benefit for the management) and potentially influence the
price and terms at which the sale would take place, if at all. The raider then
faces an option to abandon the takeover or to continue with the attempt and
initiate bargaining with the management of target company. In case of sale
of the company, the management is going to be let go. It is reasonable to
assume, that such structure would be common knowledge among the entities
taking part in this problem, as such setup does not alter the real scenario
anticipated by the author of this thesis, apart from assigning the events into
a firm timeline framework.7
Although in the section regarding defense strategies in this thesis we have
discussed several empirical observations of market value declines as effect of
utilized strategies as well as several other parameters of defense strategies,
we are going to apply them as variables, due to the results provided by the
research may not be suitable for determining the values in specific cases.8
In addition to assuming the agents are aware of the structure of the
problem, we are also going to assume they will play the game specified
further under perfect information. Despite the potential inapplicability of
results from academic research as values of the variables, it is feasible to
expect the companies either initiating or being targeted by a hostile takeover
to have the resources to perform a thorough analysis unveiling these values
preceding committing to formation of their respective strategy of choice. We
7The assignment does not conflict with the real scenario in which the events may have various dur-
ations, as the order of them shall remain unchanged. The negotiation between the raider and a share-
holder representative may be unrealistic, however was included to represent the Revlon rule, as in case
the shareholders of the target company would get a better offer without any further interference of the
management, they are entitled to it and any interference of the management would be considered breaking
their fiduciary duties.
8While not arguing with the aggregate results provided by the research reviewed in the section re-
garding defense strategies, we cannot be sure the values are generally representative, as the boards of the
companies which were examined may have (and it is likely that they did) have analyzed the expected
effects of utilization of a strategy and only implementing it in case the expectations were feasible, thus
possibly creating a selection bias.
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will also assume the raider has sufficient available financing at least at the
value of his perceived premium.
The management of the target company is going to derive their utility
from some premium of private benefit B which they consume as a result of
controlling the target company9 and value of the shares of the proportion
of the target company they own, or in case of successful takeover from the
proportion of the added value which the raider sees in the target company
appertaining them combined with other monetary transfers resulting from
utilization of some of the defense strategies. The raider derives his utility
from the proportion of amount of the added value arising from potential
synergies which is going to associate to him and potential transfers from
the company to the raider in case of an unsuccessful takeover. Lastly, the
shareholders (who are not part of the game, however we must take them into
account during the calculations) of the target company derive their utility
from the premium at which the shares are going to be purchased in the case
of sale of the company and from the market value of the shares in the case
of preservation of status quo.
Defense strategies
Utilization of a staggered board may decrease the market value of the target
company by α1 percent and will also impose extra costs on the raider (e.g.
through unrealized changes in the target company throughout the waiting
period) in the amount of a. Poison pill is a very specific strategy which may
completely prevent any attempt of the hostile takeover and for feasibility
of the model we are going to treat it as a strategy which may only be
implemented by itself and it is going to increase the amount of shares raider
needs to purchase λ-times. It will however decrease the market value of the
target company by α2 percent. Implementing golden parachutes will cause
decline of the market value of target company by α3 and a monetary transfer
9B might be understood as the difference between the private benefit the management receives at
the target company and the highest private benefit it would receive in another company in which could
employ it.
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from the raider (although the amount would be paid by the target company
as an entity, we can account the transfer to the raider as he is going to be
the owner of the company) g representing the amount at which are golden
parachutes set. This amount would also be transferred from the shareholders
of the target company to the managers in case the game would not result
into a takeover, however the managers would be let go.
Dual class recapitalization provides increased bargaining power of the
management, thus increasing the price at which the management would be
willing to sell their shares to the raider by γ10, however also decreases the
market value of shares owned by the managers by θ in case the takeover
would not take place. In case of implementation of targeted repurchase or a
standstill agreement, the effect will only take place in case of the takeover
resulting in no sale and will be represented as a transfer t from the private
benefit consumed by the management to the raider. Lastly, utilization crown
jewel defense is reflected by c, representing the decrease in the premium at
which the raider is willing to buy the company and importantly α6, repres-
enting the percentage decline in the market value of the company.
In addition, all the defense strategies increase the probability δ of the
management being let go in case the game will resolve into not selling the tar-
get company. To simplify the notation let I be a set of all defense strategies
utilized in the respective directed path from the root to the terminal node
of the extensive game model. We are going to treat the variables
∀i ∈ I : αi > 0, a ≥ 0, δi ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, g ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0,Θ ≥ 0, O ≥ 0, t ≥ 0
describing the impact of the defense strategies as exogenous and with the
properties X−a−g−c−γ ≥ τ , where τ > 0 and O ≤ X
2
. As aforementioned,
these variables are known to the agents. The defense strategies and their
impact are summarized in Table 1.
10γ expresses the lump sum of an extra premium available only to the management.
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Table 1: Effects of defense strategies
Name i Effects
Staggered board 1 Decrease in the market value by α2 percent
Extra costs for raider a
Increase in the probability of the management
being let go in case of an unsuccessful takeover by δ1
Poison pill 2 Decrease in the market value by α2 percent
Increasing the total number of shares by λ-multiple
Increase in the probability of the management
being let go in case of an unsuccessful takeover by δ2
Golden parachutes 3 Decrease in the market value by α3 percent
Transfer from the raider or the shareholders
of the target to the management g
Increase in the probability of the management
being let go in case of an unsuccessful takeover by δ3
Dual class recapitalization 4
Increase in the price for raider for the portion of
the target company owned by management by γ
Decrease in the market value of the proportion of
the shares of the target company owned by the
management by θ
Increase in the probability of the management




Transfer from the private benefit of the
management to the raider t
Increase in the probability of the management
being let go in case of an unsuccessful takeover by δ5
Crown jewel 6 Decrease in the market value by α3 percent
Decrease in the premium perceived by
the raider by c
Increase in the probability of the management
being let go in case of an unsuccessful takeover by δ6
Utility functions
With the information about the structure about the problem we shall now
continue by assigning the entities in this problem utility functions. Firstly,
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the raider whose utility beyond the scope of the takeover we may normalize
to 0, as it will not have any effect on the problem, is interested in maximizing
the remainder of the premium created by synergies. Let ε be the proportion
of the remainder of the premium assigned to the shareholders of the target
company and βM > 0 be the proportion of the target company owned by the







(1− ε)(X − a− c− g − γ), takeover
t, else
The target shareholders’ utility is affected by the proportion of the re-
mainder of the premium they receive in the case of a successful takeover
taking place and in the case of the sale not happening, they will be affected
by the drop in the market value of the target company and the potential
of letting the management go in case the company has golden parachutes
provision included. Let M be the market value of the target company before























Finally, the utility of the management is in the case of the takeover de-
termined by the amount of the premium which is going to be assigned to
them, any potential further increase in price for shares held by the manage-
ment achieved by dual class recapitalization and consumption of the poten-
tial golden parachutes. In the case of sale of the target company on the other
hand, the management gains utility from the market value of the portion of
the shares it owns, the private benefit weighted by the probability of being
let go because of the utilized defense strategies and decreased by the trans-
fers made due to utilization of targeted repurchase & standstill agreement.




a part of it. All the branches which are not displayed in Figure 3 (indicated
by the dashed line) are however in the same form as the outgoing branch of
node stage 3-3 going through node stage 4-6. All nodes across the stages
marked with an odd number are nodes which represent the outcome in which
the target company is not sold and all nodes across the stages marked with
an even number represent the outcome in which the takeover is successful. It
is necessary to mention that for some amounts of the tender offer the game
tree is going to be reduced (e.g. if no preemptive strategies were used and
the tender offer is O = X
2
, utilization of any defense strategy would be a
breach of fiduciary duties of the management, as it would necessarily result
into reduction of the price the shareholders are eligible to according to the
Revlon rule).
Bargaining
We are going to find a general solution of the bargaining problem by includ-
ing all the possible variables which may occur with respect to the defense
strategies chosen and while describing the game in extensive form treat all
the variables which are attributed to the defense strategies which were not
used as 0.
To identify the equilibrium of the bargain, we are first going to find ε∗
representing the proportion of X−a−c−g−γ attributed to the shareholders
of the target company including the management in case the takeover takes
place and then compare the utility such a sale provides to the agents with
their alternatives in case no agreement was reached. We are going to search
for such ε, which maximizes the product of gains in utility of the agents at
the stage of the game at which the raider is making the decision whether to
bargain or not.
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By taking the derivative with respect to ε we obtain the expression
and as (X − a − c − g − γ) ≥ τ > 0 and βM > 0 we can simply observe
that by setting the expression equal to zero, we obtain
At this point we must find the payoffs arising from such ε∗. We can
simply substitute ε in the gains utility for ε∗.
However, the payoffs will take this form only in the case both parties
are better off than if no agreement was reached, thus we must now decide
whether both of the potential payoffs are positive, as in every other case,
no agreement is going to be reached. We may describe the equilibria of this
bargaining game as
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and thus we may continue with the formulation of the model of the game
in extensive form.
Adjusting the model
Before assigning the payoffs to the terminal nodes, we shall first reduce the
options of the management to only available defense strategies. To evaluate
whether the option to choose a given defense strategy is going to be available
to the management, we must compute the utility of the shareholders and
compare it with the original tender offer11. We may do this simply by
substituting ε∗ for ε in the utility function.
Now it is obvious, that the management is not allowed to choose any
strategy which would conclude into preventing the takeover after the raider
has proposed his initial tender offer if ∀i ∈ I : αi > 0, the expression
11We are again performing this step to ensure the legal aspect does not breach the logical connection
of the model to a real-world situation. We are essentially making a tradeoff, as on one hand we are
improving accuracy of the model in the sense of the management not possessing godlike powers, on the
other hand however, we are also, in extreme cases, reducing the ability of the management to influence
the outcome enough.
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certainly holds. Thus firstly, to decide which outgoing branches may fol-
low from each of the nodes in Stage 3 (representing the choices on sets of
defensive strategies the management can utilize), we must find only such
branches, for which the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs fulfill the con-
dition u∗s ≥ 0. In the special case of no strategies being implemented, instead
of removing the branch which lead to the bargaining, we will swap the payoff
for one representing the original tender offer. In the next step, we must elim-
inate all branches originating in the root of the tree and potentially leading
to a node in Stage 3 which has no outgoing branches. To clarify, we are
not solving the game, as we are rather adjusting the model to reflect the
possibilities and available choices determined the values of the exogenous
variables.
Payoffs
If we now keep the naming of the nodes depicted in Figure 3, resetting to 1
at the beginning at each stage, we may attribute payoffs to all the terminal
nodes which we did not eliminate while adjusting the model. We may obtain
the payoffs in terms of utility for even terminal nodes branching from nodes
in Stage 4 by substituting the ε∗ we found while solving the bargaining
problem for ε in the utility functions. As these nodes represent a successful
takeover, we might calculate the utility not as the whole utility function,
but rather only as the part regarding a successful takeover. If we let j ∈ N
be the number of the terminal node in stage 4, we obtain
and
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As for the odd terminal nodes branching from nodes in stage 4, we may
simply use the part of the respective utility regarding the situation in which
hostile takeover does not happen.
and Π̃2j+1R = t. Also we add for the very first terminal node in stage 4







Next of the model remaining undescribed are nodes stage 3-9; 10. These
nodes are the result of utilization of the poison pill defense strategy. We are
going to use the insight provided by the research on this topic and utilize
λ as a multiplier of the number of outstanding shares. As this strategy
in general serves as an ultimate protection against hostile takeovers, in our
model we have set it up in such a way, it may be only used as a singleton. We
can therefore simply derive the utilities arising from the use of this strategy
by taking λ times α2M as the price for which the shares are going to be
purchased. Thus, by taking s as a sale and n as no-sale for the indices we
obtain
4.2 Results
We do not attempt to provide a fully general solution to the model, as it has
already been proven that such solution exists and can be found utilizing the
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backward induction method. Identification of the equilibria in the general
form is overly complex in terms of “for which interval of which parameter are
we going to get which result”. Unfortunately, either is the premise we are
working with, that the companies do analyze potential effects of application
of hostile takeovers wrong, or the data is not publicly available. It would
be rather curious, if no such analysis was taking place, thus it is more likely
that in the interest of protection of company secrets such documents are
kept private.
This model uncovers the relationship between defense strategies against
hostile takeovers and the effects it has on the shareholders’ wealth, as well as
illuminates the different interests of the shareholders and the management.
If the model resembles the reality at least to some extent, dual class recapit-
alization seems to be a very dangerous tool in the hands of a management in
a company with weak corporate governance. Although it has not proven to
be malicious to its full potential in this model, if we categorized this strategy
differently - as a preemptive strategy - the ability of the management to di-
vert the premium at which the company could be purchased is vast. If used
strategically, it could even be acceptable in the legal merits, as tender offer
would not yet be presented.
The structure of the payoffs also confirms a very interesting phenomenon,
as the shareholders do need the management’s representation in negotiations
to increase the proportion of the premium over the market value they are
going to receive, however simultaneously it is in their best interest to limit
the powers of the management to the least extent possible, as only strong
corporate governance may stop the management from deciding on the distri-
bution of the premium under their own discretion, provided the information
gap between the management and the shareholders.
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5 Conclusion
In this thesis we have discussed hostile takeovers and mainly defense strategies
against them. We have also covered games in extensive form and bargain-
ing problem. We attempted to formulate a game-theoretic model which
describes the process of a hostile takeover. We did succeed in utilizing bar-
gaining equilibria as payoffs in the model of a hostile takeover and thus
uncovered some of the impacts defense strategies have on the utility of the
shareholders of the target company, the raider and the management. Al-
though this thesis failed to provide clear answers to the questions posed, it
did provide some insight on the difference of interests between the share-
holders and their managers along the way. The introduction of the Revlon
rule to the model also brought some insight on the way hostile takeovers
are being resolved, as legal boundaries do almost force the parties to engage
into negotiations and thus break the nature of true hostility in the takeover.
This thesis, however, did by no means fully uncover the process of hos-
tile takeover from game theoretic perspective, as many of the flaws which
presented themselves during the formulation of the model could be fixed
by implementing elements from behavioral game theory and access to more
relevant data. Finally, this thesis made an effort to demonstrate the inter-
action among the raider’s, shareholders’ and management’s wealth through
the payoff functions of the extensive form model of a hostile takeover.
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